A War Neither America Nor Iran Can Win

The Strait of Hormuz has become a symbol of the conflict between Washington and Tehran, but this is more than just a dispute over waterway access. It’s a battle for influence that goes far beyond the strait’s strategic importance. The United States and Iran have been trading military strikes, each convinced it holds the upper hand. However, beneath the surface lies a game of chicken, with both nations refusing to yield despite mounting costs.

The 2019 memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran was always fragile. It was unclear what each side hoped to achieve: for the US, it was a way to ease economic pressure on Iran while gradually constraining its coercive capabilities; for Tehran, it was an opportunity to test American seriousness and appetite for a wider deal.

As the agreement unraveled, Iranian officials concluded that the US was using the lull to weaken them by degrees. From Tehran’s perspective, the initial agreement had become a mechanism for extracting concessions. This is more than just a matter of diplomatic miscommunication; it’s a manifestation of deep-seated mistrust between two nations with fundamentally different worldviews.

For Washington, freedom of navigation through the Strait is an absolute necessity for broader diplomacy. For Tehran, the threat to navigation is leverage to be traded away only within a comprehensive settlement. This isn’t just a dispute over the waterway; it’s a clash of values that goes to the heart of each nation’s identity.

Iran’s return to conflict can be seen as a calculated gamble. Its leaders seem to judge gradual strategic erosion as more dangerous than another confrontation with the US and potentially Israel. By escalating tensions, Tehran hopes to raise the cost of the standoff enough to force Washington back to the table on broader terms.

However, this strategy may be flawed. Tehran’s leadership fears a staged unwinding of its leverage, believing that once it stops threatening shipping and restrains its regional partners, those tools become difficult to recover. Escalation is meant to increase pressure on Washington to accept a comprehensive settlement. Yet Tehran may be misreading the source of Trump’s caution.

Donald Trump entered his second term with an aggressive projection of American power, assuming that overwhelming force could quickly compel Iran to submit. His reluctance to accept an open-ended war coexists with a deep aversion to humiliation, creating the risk that failed coercion will lead not to restraint but to further escalation.

The domestic situation in Iran makes compromise even harder. The nine-day funeral procession for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei exposed real uncertainty and elevated calls for revenge. The absence of new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei from public view underscores how unsettled the distribution of power remains inside a factionalized system that still depends on internal consensus to function.

A fatwa against Trump issued by Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi reinforces this dynamic, recasting Trump as a personal and religious adversary of the Islamic Republic. Continued conflict also benefits the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls the state’s principal instruments of military and regional pressure.

As the war of wills between Washington and Tehran continues to escalate, it becomes clear that neither side has a clear advantage. The real losers are the people of Iran and the Middle East, caught in the crossfire of this struggle for influence. What happens next is uncertain, but one thing is certain: the consequences of this war will be far-reaching and devastating.

The stalemate between Washington and Tehran serves as a reminder that even the most powerful nations can become trapped in their own perceptions. As long as each side insists on its own version of reality, the Strait of Hormuz will remain a symbol of the war neither America nor Iran can win – a war of wills that will only continue to exact a terrible price from all parties involved.